BGP, the de facto inter-domain routing protocol, is the core component of current Internet infrastructure. BGP traffic deserves thorough exploration, since abnormal BGP routing dynamics could impair global Internet connectivity and stability. In this paper, two methods, signature-based detection and statistics-based detection, are designed and implemented to detect BGP anomalous routing dynamics in BGP UPDATEs. Signature-based detection utilizes a set of fixed patterns to search and identify routing anomalies. For the statistics-based detection, we devise five measures to model BGP UPDATEs traffic. In the training phase, the detector is trained to learn the expected behaviors of BGP from the historical longterm BGP UPDATEs dataset. It then examines the test dataset to detect "anomalies" in the testing phase.
II. RELATED WORK
Signature-based detection and anomaly-based detection are two major approaches in modern intrusion detection area. Signature based detection systems, such as the Snort IDS [4] , report an attack when a set of symptoms corresponding to a predefined attack signature is observed. Anomaly-based intrusion detection flags as attacks any traffic that is unusual for that system. Statistical based anomaly detection systems are trained on some dataset; thereafter, any traffic that statistically differs from the training data is considered an attack.
As the de facto inter-domain routing protocol employed by edge routers, BGP is responsible for spreading the routing information throughout the Internet. BGP is a path vector protocol. BGP routing information carries a sequence of AS number, indicating the path a route has traversed. Routing information is exchanged between the two BGP routers through UPDATE messages. Incremental updates are sent as network information changes.
BGP routing behavior has received a lot of examination in the research literature. Labovitz et al. [5] showed that unstable and pathological routing behaviors dominated the Internet around 1996. Later, they presented potential explanations for these anomalies [6] . Other BGP routing problems, such as slow convergence [1] , persistent MED oscillation [7] , [8] , have also been well examined. Rexford et al. defined the metric "BGP event" to measure the BGP routing instability and concluded that routes to the popular destinations were generally stable [9] . In order to generate the realistic BGP traffic for testing, Maennel et al. extensively studied BGP traffic and characterized the statistics properties of BGP traffic [10] .
Also concerning about the abnormal BGP route changes, Wang et al. [11] proposed a path-filtering approach to validate the correct route changes for DNS prefixes. Teoh et al. develop an interactive visulization process to explore BGP data [12] . These works are complementary to our appraoches described in this paper.
III. DATASET
The dataset we examine in the paper are BGP UPDATE messages collected by the collector RRC00 of the Routing Information Service of RIPE [13] . RRC00 has multi-hop BGP sessions with 9 peer ASes that are located at different countries. Because BGP updates reflect route changes of peering AS, we use BGP updates as our target. In addition, because the anomalies that we concerned in this paper are anomalous routing behaviors for a single prefix, we only select BGP updates for the selected prefixes.
Two major steps are needed to transform BGP raw updates into the input of our BGP anomaly detector.
First, these messages are converted from the binary format to ASCII format through route btoa, a software 4 provided by Multi-threaded Routing Toolkit (MRT). Second, the ASCII messages are parsed by a script one by one. This script filters out irrelevant messages based on three metrics. A message is relevant if it satisfies all three of the following conditions:
The message must announce or withdraw the prefix currently being monitored.
The message must come from the source AS which is our chosen observation point AS.
The message must come from one particular router in the source AS. Messages with the same AS path information might come from different routers within the same source AS redundantly.
Therefore, this metric filters out the duplicated effects.
In addition, due to the known implementation problem in some vender's BGP router [6] , duplicated updates may be announced for the same prefixes consequently. Duplicate update itself is a type of anomaly since it does not reflect route changes, However, in our experiments, we remove them from dataset because the origin of this anoamy is well-known.
Different prefixes may show different behaviors, and even for a simple prefix, the routing behaviors may be different from different observation point. In our experiments, we select 20 prefixes (4 prefixes for root DNS servers, 4 prefixes for gTLD servers, 4 prefixes for popular destinations, 4 prefixes from Department of Defense, 2 from Korean, 2 from China) from 9 peer ASes.
IV. SIGNATURE DETECTION
In this part, we describe a set of signatures that depict the anomalous routing dynamics.
A. Patterns of Anomalous BGP Dynamics
A route announced by a BGP router is generally the best route at that moment. Comparing the consecutive announced routes, we can infer the route changes in that router's BGP routing table. In order to compare the consecutively announced routes, we assign a value corresponding to the preference of each route based on BGP route selection process. We first briefly describe the route selection process [14] .
Given a set of different BGP route announcements, 1) Accept the routes with the highest LOCAL PREFER.
2) If the LOCAL PREFER is the same, prefer the route with the shortest AS PATH.
3) If the AS PATH length is the same, prefer the route with lowest origin type, where a route originally learned from internal protocol (IGP) is preferable to a route learned from external protocol (EGP), which is preferable to a route injected into BGP via redistribution statically or dynamically.
(INCOMPLETE). Note that, since the BGP updates are collected through the EBGP sessions, we cannot acquire some information on the following four aspects: LOCAL PREFERENCE, source of the route(EBGP or IBGP), the IGP cost to the NEXT HOP, and router ID. We can assign relative preference by comparing the AS PATH length, origin type and MED value of each consecutive route announcement.
Based on the relative preference value of two consecutive routes, we define four terms.
UP: if the second route is more preferable than the previous one, we label the second route as UP.
DOWN: if the second route is less preferable than the previous one, we label the second route as DOWN.
FLAT: if two routes have the same preference, we label the second route as FLAT.
WD: if the second announcement is route withdrawal, we label the second route as WD.
We define BGP update burst as a sequence of updates within a short time window. Formally, BGP update burst is consecutive updates for the same prefix that space close together and the time interval between update messages is less than ¡ and the average update rate notice that AS2914 and AS13129 are more stable than AS3549 and AS3257 for these particular prefixes.
For example, no anomaly for Yahoo prefix is observed from AS2914 while 28 anomalies have been noted from AS3257; for prefix 166.111/16, 8 anomalies are seen from AS13129 while 195 anomalies are observed from AS3549. In addition, Yahoo prefix is the most stable prefix, confirming the conclusion that popular prefixes are usually stable in the paper [9] . Although the DNS root server-A prefix is well engineered and maintained, it still shows some unstable incidences. It is probably due to the fact that bgp flap damping [15] is unused on the root server prefixes, some of frequent route changes are not suppressed.
We notice that the DoD prefixes has total 69 type F incidences observed from 5 ASes. The pattern capturing these special sequences is frequent substitutions of AGGREGATOR. Due to limited information, we cannot verify whether or not this special behavior is normal BGP operation. However, the rate of AGGREGATOR substitution is very high, once per minute on average, which deserves more attention from the operators to figure out what happened in the DoD networks. In addition, as paper [16] pointed out, the local AGGREGATOR changes in theory should be restricted in the local area, but not be propagated AS3549 and AS3257 have more type F sequences than other three ASes. We find that some of Type F update bursts for prefix 166.111/16 are due to community attribute changes. The change rate is very high.
For example, in one case, AS 3549 changed the community attribute 4 times in 6 seconds. These frequent changes of community attribute generate a lot of BGP updates in short peroid of time. If the downstream BGP router performs BGP route flap damping, the route announced by AS3549 would be suppressed.
We performed BGP route flap damping (using default CISCO router's damping parameters [17] ) on the Jan. 2003 updates data, we find that 174 out of 250 effective updates would be suppressed, and the total suppression time in that month is 7.3 hours.
In addition, from AS3257, we observe that the DNS root server-A prefix has 17 type F incidences, 7
out of which are oscillations of two routes. The two routes, 
V. STATISTICS-BASED ANOMALY DETECTION
We apply a statistics-based anomaly detection method, NIDES/STAT [18] , which is introduced first by SRI. The NIDES/STAT algorithm monitors a subject's behavior on a computer system, and raises alarm when the subject's current (short-term) behavior deviates significantly from its expected behavior, which is described by its long-term profile. This is achieved through a ¡ -like test for comparing the similarity between the testing data and training data.
In this section, we will first introduce the algorithm and then elaborate on the measures specially designed for BGP anomaly detection.
A. Algorithm
Here are some notations for the NIDES/STAT algorithm: let the current system behavior be a random variable under sample space For the detailed computation of these variables, please refer [18] .
e) AS path difference (M5):
In order to compare the current AS path with the common used AS path , we employ this measure. We use a Simi(path1, path2) function to calculate the difference between two AS paths. First, we define the AS path as a string in which each character is an AS number. Then we calculate the edit distance of two strings. Edit distance is the smallest number of insertions, deletions, and substitutions required to change one string to another. In Simi function, path1 is the current AS path, path2 is the historical dominant AS path which is usually the most stable path. The edit distance of two paths denotes their difference. The larger the distance, the more the difference.
2) Combination of five measures:
The NIDES/STAT algorithm defines another variable 
C. Experiments for Statistics-based Anomaly Detection 1) Experiments overview:
Our experiments consist of two major parts, historical profile training and detecting process.
1) Long term historical profile training is the process by which the anomaly detector learns the past behaviors for a subject. (Please note here we only declare they are past behavior not normal behavior)
2) Detecting process examines the testing data by comparing current routing behaviors with the historical behaviors. If the deviation score is above the predefined threshold, a warning will be flagged. Otherwise, the data will be considered normal and incorporated into historical profile.
In the rest of this subsection, we will discuss the critical parameters for our anomaly detector and show the experiment results.
2) Experiments parameters:
Certain parameters have significant impacts on the performance of the statistics-based BGP anomaly detector. As the preliminary stage ofour experiment, we chooose the parameters based on our past experience. In practice, choice of these parameters needs comprehensive consideration.
First, the decay factor has a significant impact on our detector. According to [4] , most convergence time is about 3 minutes. Thus, in the case of inter-arrival time measure, the decay factor is set to be 0.00333333, which corresponds to the half-life of 300 seconds or 5 minutes. Please note that convergence time is a function of the topology, MRAI timer, route flap damping, and routing policy. We cannot prove that this decay value is optimal. However, based on the distribution of the inter-arrival time for each prefixes we observed, most of inter-arrival time is less than 300 seconds or greater than 3000 seconds. We choose 300 seconds as half-life value to capture the frequent route changes. For the categorical measure, we set the half-life decay to 20 BGP update messages, corresponding to an ¥ ¦ .
3) Experiment results:
Anomaly detection is capable of finding the known and unknown anomalous behaviors. We test our statistical anomaly detector on the BGP UPDATE data to see whether it is able to effectively detect the BGP routing anomalies and whether it can help users to analyze the BGP routing dynamics. We conduct our test in two directions.
We perform the test on the BGP UPDATEs data during SQL worm attack. Although SQL worm does not intent to attack BGP protocol, BGP has been impacted during worm attack. We test our detector to see if the detector can find out the anomalies in that period. The results show that there are indeed anomalous routing behaviors during that period, and the information provided by the detector gives confirmatory supports to the speculation that the major anomaly is slow convergence correlated to SQL worm.
In order to compare the results with those from signature detection, we perform the test on the same prefixes. We notice that statistics-based anomaly detector identified fewer incidences than signature- based detector. Furthermore, most of the incidences identified by statistics-based anomaly detector belong to the subset of anomalies identified by signature. However, those incidences appear to be more deviant indicating that statistical anomaly detector can select the most anomalous incidences.
In the following part, we will show the experiment results for these tests and conduct an analysis. In fact, we find that this is a case of classical slow convergence incidence [1] . We speculate that since SQL worms generated huge amount of traffic and congested some link (we believe in this example,the link was between AS1239 and AS9407), the BGP session between that two AS was down, so AS1239
announced a withdrawal. Due to propagation delay, AS3333 had to exploit some backup routes that actually had already become invalid but AS3333 did not know at that moment. AS3333 suffered the slow convergence and at last it withdrew the route to that prefix. This example demonstrates that our detector 
£ ¢
). This similarity leads us to further manually examine the BGP traffic of the three prefixes. The results confirm that all of them suffered slow convergence during worm attack.
b) Comparison with signature detection:
We apply statistics-based anomaly detection on the same prefixes examined by signature-based anomaly detection. Compared with signature detection, the number of anomalous incidences identified by statistics-based detection is much smaller. That is because the long term historical profile used to train the detector includes many incidences indentified by the signatures as "abnormal". In the training phase, the anomaly detector learns these incidences as the normal ones.
Consequently, in the testing phase, many similar incidences are neglected. We will show the an example to exlain this case later in the paper. is all BGP updates from AS2914 for that prefixes in 2002. Although prefixes for DNS root servers are well maintained, we still find out one "relative anomaly". For this case, the result of statistics anomaly detection is the same as that of signature detection. Signature detector only detects this incidence as Type B anomaly. We will show this anomaly and explain why the statistics based detector flags it as anomalous routing later in the paper. incidences as normal incidences, and records the statistics properties into long-term profile. In the testing phase, when the detector scans these similar incidences, it cannot find out the significant difference so that no warning is flagged.
Although the statistics-based detector fails to detect anomalies caused by the worm, it did flag a warning for one type B incidence that is worth of more investigation than the incidences caused by the worm.
(highlighted in figure 4 ). The abnormal in that type B incidence is the brand new fail-over path, At the current stage, we are unable to evaluate the identified anomalies, because evaluation is based on root cause analysis which is still an open question. The major barrier for root cause analysis is that we cannot acquire the necessary information from the real operational network. Further, root cause analysis for BGP anomalies may need cooperations among ASes, because under some circumstances, identification of certain causes is almost a mission impossible for an individual AS. However, given the current selfish routing environment, this cooperation is hard to archive. Thus, the goal of our current work is not to provide accrate root causes analysis for speculative anomalies. In stead, we aim to devise an approach to identify possible anomalies, which is the first step towards solving the root cause analysis problem. We have proposed a future project targeting at this problem, in which we plan to build a large-scale BGP testbed [20] . Whithin this testbed, we are capable to fully control the netwroks, and even simulate the network failures and attacks. At that stage, since we can manipulate the root causes, we will be in a better place to evaluate the detector's performance . BGP dataset due to its large quantity. The most reasonable way is to mainly focus on a small set of valuable data. With this goal in mind, we proppose two approaches, signature-based detection and statistics-based detection, to search for anomalous BGP routing dynamics. We apply these approaches to examine the real BGP UPDATE data collected by RIPE-NCC. The results show that these approaches can effectively and efficiently identify the anomalous BGP routing behavoirs.
The value of our work lies in the following aspects: First, we develop two systematic approaches to detect abnormal BGP UPDATE traffic. In current network management, they can help opeartors and researchers to filter out the trival events and focus mainly on the most important BGP events. Second, through our experiments, we identify advantages and limitations of both methods. A feasible way to overcome the weakness of each is through combination of both. Third, these two detection approaches can be further used in monitoring and analyzing the real-time BGP traffic. In particular, statistics-based approach can quantitively measure the "abnormality" of each BGP UPDATE.
The limiation of our work lies in the lack of information from real BGP run-time environment. At this stage, we are not able to thoroughly evaluate the identified anomalies. Root causes for most of the anomalies are still our conjectures. However, in our future work, we plan to attack this problem by building a large scale BGP testbed [20] . In this simulated BGP operational environment, we can generate various fully-controlled network failures and attacks. Applying the detection approaches to examine the simulated BGP traffic, we can provide a more extensive evalation of the detectors' performance.
